Ghazali vs Ibn Taymiyyah: Islamic compatibilism
Ghazali Or Taymiyyah: Which Theologian Best Explains Islam’s Compatibilism?
Divine creed, or predestination, is the idea that everything that will happen has already been decided by God himself. Free will, on the other hand, is the idea that we humans have agency that we can make our own decisions and act how we want. Both of these concepts of God determining and willing everything and human free will are found in numerous places in the Quran and Sunnah. The debate on whether Islam is a religion that holds absolute determinism or full free will (free will without God interfering) is not an ongoing debate. Majority of Muslims uphold that Islam upholds a compatibilist framework; that we can have both free will and that God has determined everything. However, a debate that does occur is in how do we combine the verses that uphold God’s power and divine decree, and the verses that upholds that humans have free will? The 'howness' of Islamic compatibilism has troubled Muslim theologians and Philosophers for a long time. Two responses, however, have come to the forefront in trying to explain how we can combine these seemingly two contradictory views. One response is that from the great Ashari scholar and philosopher, Imam Ghazali, and another is found in the works of the great Athari theologian Imam Ibn Taymiyyah. In this paper, I will be arguing that in comparing both Imam Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah’s view on Islam’s compatibilism between free will and determinism, that Ibn Tamiyyah’s theory best aligns with the Quran and Sunnah as compared to that of Imam Ghazali.
In order to show that, this paper will be divided into three sections. The first section will present what Qadr, Divine creed, is in Islam, the Quranic verses in support of Qadr, and also show the Quranic evidences for free will as well. The second section will then compare and contrast Ghazali’s view and Ibn Taymiyyah’s view, and in the final section I will present Quranic verses and hadiths that show that Ibn Taymiyyah’s view is more inline with that of the Quran and Sunnah.
Qadr and Free Will
To start off, let us take a look at Qadr in Islam. Qadr can be translated as divine decree or predestination. This is the view that all actions and all things that occur and will occur are preordained by Allah. The belief in Qadr is foundational to Islam. The importance of Qadr is clearly shown in the Hadith of jibreel. In this Hadith, the angel Jibreel came to the Prophet Muhammad in a form of a man and, after asking him what Islam is, asks the Prophet what Imaan is. The Prophet responds by saying that Imaan is: "It is that you believe in Allah and His angels and His Books and His Messengers and in the Last Day, and in fate (qadar), both in its good and in its evil aspects” (Imam Nawawi, 2). One of the 6 pillars of Iman is that of belief in Qadr. Essentially, Qadr is fundamental to Islam. Such as one needs to believe in Allah, one needs to believe in Qadr. Clearly, Qadr is fundamental to one’s faith.
According to many scholars of Islam, there are 4 aspects to Al-Qadr. These 4 aspects or elements are:
- Believing that God know what will happen
- Believing that God wrote what will happen
- Believing that God wills what will happen
- Believing that God creates what will happen. (Al-Mohsinun).
For one to believe in Qadr in its entirety, based on a large number of Islamic scholars, they need to believe in all 4 of these elements. If one were to claim that God knew what would happen, wrote what will happen, but does not create what will happen, then he does not believe in Qadr in its entirety.
In terms of these 4 elements, there are many verses in the Quran that highlight them. For instance, Allah states in the Quran, “this is truly a glorious Quran (written) on a Preserved Tablet” (Quran 85:21-22). Furthermore, Allah states in the Quran “Are you not away that God knows all that is in the heavens and the earth? All that is written in a Record; this is easy for God” (Quran, 22:70). And lastly, Allah also states “it is he who has control over the heavens and the earth and has no offspring-no one shares control with Him- and Who created all things and made them to an exact measure” (Quran 25:2). All of these verses in the Quran link back to all 4 aspects of Qadr. Allah has written everything in a Preserved Tabled, he knows everything, he created and even willed everything that will happen.
In seeing the importance of Qadr in Islam, there were some defiant groups that formed around the issue of Qadr. One such group were the Jahmiya’s. The Jahmiya’s upheld that we have do not have any free will and that God is in control of everything. The Jahmiya’s upheld absolute determinism (Salem, 29). The reason for this is that in order to defend God’s power, the Jahmiya believed that God needs to have determined everything for us. If we had free will, then God would not have been able to have power over us. In seeing the verses present previously and the importance of Qadr in one’s Imaan, one can see why they upheld such an extreme view.
However, the Jahmiya’s seem to have only seen Islam through this lens of Qadr. I.e., they seem to be ignoring a large portion of the Quran in order to make this claim. When one looks at other verses in the Quran, the Quran clearly highlights that we humans have free will. For instance, in the Quran, Allah states, “Each soul is responsible for its own actions; no soul will bear the burden of another. You will all return to your Lord in the end, and He will tell you the truth about you differences” (Quran 6:164). Here Allah states that everyone is responsible for their own actions. Whether we obey or disobey God, we humans have a sense of responsibility in our actions. In another part of the Quran, Allaht states: “If you did well you did well for yourselves, if you did evil you did it against yourselves” (Quran, 17:7). This verse highlights the choice that human beings have. Allah states that if one does good, i.e., chooses to do good, they did it for themselves.
Similar to the belief in Qadr, there were other groups of Muslims who held a one-sided view on this matter of free will and determinism. On the opposite end of the Jahmiya’s, the Qadariya’s upheld the view that God does not determine anything for us and we have full free will. The Qadariya believed that if God determined everything that will happen to us, then we cannot be judged by our actions when taken to God. If we choose to do evil or to do good, this decision needs to be made by us and the only way for that to happen is if we have free will without an all-powerful God dictating and determining our actions (Mutrofin, 1).
In seeing the verses that talk about Qadr and Allah’s power, and the verses that discuss human free will, we can understand why the Qadariyah and the Jahmiya groups were formed. The Jahmiya’s wanted to defend God’s power, while the Qadariyah wanted to defend human agency. While both groups might have read the verses that seemed to oppose their views, these groups did not find a way to merge the verses of free will and the verses of God’s ultimate power together. And thus, they chose either one of these two extreme views: either absolute determinism or full free will.
Now that we have seen all these verses and the difficulty some Muslim groups have had in explaining free will and determinism, we can now move on to discuss the explanation given by Imam Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah. Both Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah try to take a middle path between that of the Qadariyah and the Jahmiya. Both Ibn Taymiyyah try to explain how God can determine and will everything while also allowing us to have free will. In this following section, we will be taking a look at both of the views of these scholars in trying to merge these two concepts together through the use of the Islamic corpus.
Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah
For starters, let us take a look at Imaam Al-Ghazali’s view. Al-Ghazali upholds the view of occasionalism and Kasb. Occasionalism is the view that God is the sole immediate cause of all events. Essentially, we humans do not cause anything to occur, all causes are solely from Allah. Ghazali states that “the connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary…their connection is due to the prior decree of God” (Moda 95). For Ghazali, what we may see as an event or someone causing something to occur is actually done by Allah and not by that event or person. Ghazali provides an example to illustrate this view. Ghazali states that imagine seeing a fire burning a piece of cotton. What we may see is that the fire is causing the cotton to be burned. However, Ghazali states that this is not what is actually happening. What is happening is that the cotton is burning at the same time as the fire but not that the cotton is being burnt by the fire. These two things are happening at the same time but not that one is the cause of the other (Ghazali, 171). Ultimately, the reason the cotton is burning is not because of the fire but because Allah himself caused the cotton to burn at the same time the fire was lit.
This view on its own does not really resolve the issue of free will and determinism. In fact, this view seems very deterministic. However, this is where the notion of Kasb comes into play. Kasb, translated as acquisition, is the concept that while all events are caused by Allah, we humans have the ability to choose our actions. Whether we want to do good or want to do evil, we have the ability to acquire (Kasb) our own actions. However, all of our actions and the results of our actions are ultimately from Allah (Suarning 31). Going back to the fire example, imagine you were to light a piece of cotton on fire. You were able to choose the action of lighting the fire yourself; however, the actual fire turning on, the cotton burning are all done by Allah. While we were able to choose the action we wanted to do, the results and the outcomes of said action that we took were from Allah himself.
In understanding Ghazali’s view on occasionalism and Kasb, let us look at how, according to Ghazali, the Quran upholds this view of occasionalism and kasb. In Tahafut al-falasifah (Incoherence of the Philosophers) Ghazali brings up the story of Abraham being cast into the fire and the fire becoming cold. While he does not cite the verse himself, the verse that he is discussing goes like this: (When he was thrown in the fire) We commanded: “O fire! Be cool and safe for Abraham!” We said, “O Fire! Be coolness and peace for Abraham.” (Quran, 21:69). In discussing this verse, Ghazali states that if one were to argue for causality other than Allah, meaning that the fire for instance can actually cause burning and has the intrinsic ability to make things burn, then in this verse one would have to make different interpretations of this event. Either the fire loss its heat, “which makes it no longer fire” or the essence of Abraham would have to be changed “into stone or something over which fire has no effect” (Ghazali, 173). The reason Ghazali says this is because if fire actually has the intrinsic property of burning and can cause things to burn, then the only way for the fire not to burn Abraham was if it was no longer fire or if Abraham was no longer human. Meaning that we would have to change how the story is presented in the Quran. On Ghazali’s view, fire itself does not cause burning to occur, it does not have the intrinsic property capable to burn. When Abraham was thrown into the fire, taking Ghazali’s view, he did not burn because Allah simply allowed Abraham to be thrown into it, and since fire does not have burning properties, Allah did not cause burning to occur at that moment. Ghazali argues that taking this view, then nothing in the story has to be altered.
Combining both Kasb and occasionalism together, we see that Ghazalli is trying to go in the middle between free will and determinism and merge the many Quranic verses and hadiths that show God’s power and human free will. In Ghazali’s view, God is able to keep his power by being the sole being that causes events to occur, but we humans are able to keep our free will by being able to choose our own actions.
Now that we have seen Ghazalli’s view, let us take a look at Ibn Taymiyya’s view. Ibn Taymiyya’s upholds the view of secondary causality. However, prior to going into what secondary causality is and how it relates to the notion of free will and determinism, we need to understand what role God’s power play in human acts. Ibn Tayymiyah upholds that God is the creator of all human acts. Ibn Tayymiyah argues that human acts originate from non-existence. To go from non-existence to existence, there needs to be something that exists in order to make it so existence comes from non-existence. This moving from non-existence to existence of an act can be caused by a human; however, if it is caused by a human, there needs to be something else prior to that human to cause that human to act in that way. This chain of causation cannot go ad infinitum, so thus, for Ibn Taymiyyah, God is the ultimate source of acts caused (Hoover 146). One can imagine a set of dominoes falling and hitting the domino to fall in front of it. If we were to go back, we would see that someone or something pushed the start of this chain to start the chain of dominoes to go from not-falling to falling (non-existence to existence in a way). So for Ibn Taymiyyah, God has ultimate power and he is the ultimate cause of all things that occur.
However, similar to Ghazali this view seems problematic and does not solve all the issues in the free will and determinism verses presented in the Quran. Ibn Taymiyyah however resolves this through his conception of secondary causality. Secondary causality is the belief that while there is an ultimate cause to all things, this ultimate cause (in this cause God) uses secondary means in order to cause what he wants to occur, to occur. Ibn Taymiyyah like Ghazalli gives an example of fire. Ibn Taymiyyah states that burning does not occur except by the fire in which God created heat and the intrinsic ability to cause things to burn (Taymiyya 158) So imagine someone lighting a fire and burning a piece of cotton (going back to Ghazali). Ibn Taymiyyah states that God is ultimately the first cause for everything, but, God utilizes humans as secondary causes in order to light the fire, and God utilizes the fire to burn the cotton. God allowed for humans and fire to have these intrinsic properties within them. God is the ultimate cause (the primary cause), but what he wants to cause is done through these secondary means, whether through humans, fire, etc.
Now that we have seen Ibn Taymiyyah’s view of God’s ultimate power and secondary causation, Ibn Taymiyyah himself presents evidences from the Quran that show his theory. In his book Tadmuriya, Ibn Taymiyyah provides the verses in the Quran in which Allah states: “By [the book] God guides whoever follows His good pleasures to ways of peace” (Quran, 5:16) And, “By this parable, He leads many astray and He guides many” (Quran 2:26). After quoting these verses, Ibn Taymiyyah said “thus, He informed that He acts by means of secondary causes (Taymiyyah, 3:112). For Ibn Taymiyyah, these verses illustrate that God works through secondary causes. In the first Ayat, people are guided by the book that Allah has sent, but they are also ultimately guided by Allah himself. In a way, God is the ultimate cause of someone’s guidance, but He does that through the use of the secondary cause of the Quran. The second Ayat shows a similar pattern. Allah sites a parable and this parable He makes people either go astray or be guided. Allah utilizes this parable as a means for His guidance of people. Both of these verses indicate that Allah works through secondary causes.
In concluding this section, Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah try to merge the verses in the Quran that discuss God’s power and determinism (Qadr) and those verses and hadiths that discuss human free will. In trying to merge these two, both Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah come up with different approaches to this. Ghazalli upholds occasional and free will, that all acts are by Allah but humans have the ability to choose their actions (but causes are done solely by Allah), while Ibn Taymiyyah upholds that God has power and is the primary cause of everything, but he utilizes secondary causes, such as us, to cause effects on this world. Now that we have seen both sides, this following section I will be arguing that Ibn Taymiyyah’s view of the use of secondary causation is more inline with the Islamic corpus than that of Ghazali’s view of occasionalism and Kasb.
Making the case for Ibn Taymiyyah
In order to make the case for Ibn Taymiyyah’s theory over that of Ghazali’s, we need to find verses in the Quran and hadith of the Prophet Muhhamd that indicate this notion of secondary causation. In a sense, many verses of the Quran and hadith can be explained through both Ghazali’s view and Ibn Taymiyyah’s view; however, if there are verses or hadiths where secondary causation seems to be prevalent or the explanation of the verse with secondary causation fits in line with the view of compatibilism more so than Ghazali’s explanation, then we will be able to see that Ibn Taymiyyah’s view is more inline with the Quran and sunnah.
Let us first take a look at several Quranic verses that show this notion of human causation. A verse that Ibn Taymiyyah himself brings up to defend his position is when Allah states in the Quran: “it is He who sends the winds…till when they have carried a heavy-laden cloud. We drive it to a land that is dead. Then We send down rain to it, and thereby We bring forth every kind of fruit” (Quran 7:57). This verse encapsulates all of what Ibn Taymiyyah is trying to argue for. For starters, it is Allah who sends down the winds and who sends down the rain. This verse highlights that God is powerful and it is only through him things can come into existence. However, what is interesting is that God is highlighting the process of how rain comes down. He explains the winds, till they formulate into a cloud and then through that cloud rain is sent forth. For Ibn Taymiyyah, while God is the one who causes the rain to come down, it is clear that God is utilizing the wind and the cloud to send down rain. Furthermore, and this to me is the most explicit part of this verse for secondary causality, “and thereby We bring forth every kind of fruit.” Allah is showing that, while ultimately through Him, fruits are grown due to the rain pollinating the land and producing fruits. I.e., there is a causal link between the rain hitting the ground and fruits being produced from that rain. If it were the case that rain, or anything for that matter, has no potential for causing anything to occur, then why did Allah present the verse in this manner? After presenting this verse as an example, Ibn Taymiyyah states that “whoever says that He acts with them and not by means of them opposes what the Quran has brought and denies what God has created of potencies and natures… that is because there is no cause among the causes but that needs another cause for its effect to occur” (Taymiyyah 157). Ibn Taymiyyah is saying that anyone who denies God’s power in causing all of this to occur and denies the chain of causality that is present in this verse, is denying part of the Quran.
Ghazali and his followers may argue back by saying that this verse does not go against the notion of occasionalism and Kasb. Ghazalli can argue that this verse is showing that Allah is the one that does all the actions that occur for the fruits to be produced. Allah constantly says that He sent the winds and that He sent the rain. I.e., Allah is always referring to himself doing these actions and not the thing itself (like the cloud and the rain) causing anything to occur. However, this response, while understandable, is weak in taking down Ibn Taymiyyah’s theory. For starters, the notion of Kasb is not prevalent at all in this verse. Wind, clouds, and rain do not have the ability to acquire their actions. So while this verse may show occasionalism, it fails to show Kasb. If this verse does not present kasb and only shows occasionalism, then what differentiates Ghazalli’s supposed middle approach between absolute determinism and free will with that of the Jahmiya’s absolute determinism? If the Ghazali’s view on this verse only shows Gods ultimate power, then the Jahmiyah’s can also use this verse to argue for absolute determinism as well. They can use the exact same arguments made by Ghazali to defend their own heretical views as well. Ibn Taymiyyah’s view not only highlights what is apparent from the verse, that things in this world can cause other things to occur, but it can also uphold God’s ultimate power as well. Therefore, not only is Allah's power upheld, but human free will can be argued for as well if we were to uphold Ibn Taymiyyah's view.
However I believe that there is a hadith of the Prophet Muhammad which not only demonstrates Ibn Taymiyyah's view properly, but also presents a clear contradiction with the view Al-Ghazali. Essentially, this hadith, if we were to uphold Ghazali's view, would lead to many contradictions. If on the other hand we held Ibn Taymiyyah's view, then we will be free of contradictions. The hadith of the Prophet goes like this:
"The example of guidance and knowledge with which Allah has sent me is like abundant rain falling on the earth, some of which was fertile soil that absorbed rain water and brought forth vegetation and grass in abundance. (And) another portion of it was hard and held the rain water and Allah benefited the people with it and they utilized it for drinking, making their animals drink from it and for irrigation of the land for cultivation. (And) a portion of it was barren which could neither hold the water nor bring forth vegetation (then that land gave no benefits). The first is the example of the person who comprehends Allah's religion and gets benefit (from the knowledge) which Allah has revealed through me (the Prophets and learns and then teaches others. The last example is that of a person who does not care for it and does not take Allah's guidance revealed through me (He is like that barren land.)" (Sahih al-Bukhari 79)
In this Hadith, the Prophet Muhammad is forming an analogy of obtaining knowledge and guidance with that of rain that falls on the earth. Allah sends rain and some parts of the land are not able to obtain any of the rain, while other parts of the land are more fertile and allow for vegetation and grass to grow from it. This analogy is like that of knowledge and guidance that is sent to people from Allah. Some people do not accept it and do not obtain anything of that knowledge, while others are not only able to obtain the knowledge but also spread this knowledge to others.
This hadith is clearly indicative of the use of secondary causation and the power of God being the ultimate cause. This hadith, even more so than the previous Quranic verses, highlight all of Ibn Taymiyyah’s view. For starters, it is Allah who ultimately sends down guidance and knowledge to the people. He is the ultimate cause of people even hearing his guidance. This relates to Ibn Taymiyyah’s and Ghazali’s view of Allah’s power. However, it is the analogy to rain that falls on the land that highlights Ibn Taymiyah’s view of secondary causation. Why would the Prophet Muhammad draw an analogy to rain falling on the land if rain does not cause land to grow and vegetate? If there were no notion of secondary causation in Islam, then the Prophet would simply say that Allah sends down guidance and knowledge and some choose to accept it while others do not. If the hadith simply mentioned that God sends guidance, it would clearly show the notion of Kasb. However, by mentioning rain and land, two things that to us seem connected with one another, it seems that this hadith is showing Ibn Tamiyyah’s secondary causation.
Ghazali, however, can have a response to many of what was said here. For starters, Ghazali never states that Allah does not work through things in this world. Ghazali upholds that Allah is the sole agent who may cause something to happen, but He may act directly or indirectly through something else, like that of angels. (Ghazali, 533, 13). So for Ghazali, the Prophet being used or the Quran being used for guidance, as per the hadith and the Ayat from the Quran, is not contradictory to his position. Ghazali simply argues that secondary causes, that things in this world can cause things by themselves, cannot occur because it is God who is the primary agent to cause things to happen. Once again, going back to the fire example, it is not fire that causes the cotton to burn, but it is Allah who when the cotton is placed in the fire allows burning to occur.
While it is true that Ghazali’s view can still give an explanation of these verses and hadith in order to defend compatibilism, these verses and hadiths still highlight the use of secondary causation and can even be better explained through the use of secondary causation. Once again, if rain does not in it of itself cause the land to vegetate, then why would the Prophet use that as an analogy connected to his guidance effecting people? Could not the Prophet simply have said that Allah sends guidance to people (occasionalism) and some people choose to accept while others do not (Kasb)? This added analogy with rain, if we were to take Ghazali’s view, does not seem to add much benefit to highlight God’s guidance to people. If we as Muslims know that rain does not cause the land to grow, then this analogy is a sense is pointless.
Another major issues arises with the view of Imam Ghazali in relation to his hadith. If the rain is an analogy of God’s knowledge and guidance, but rain has no ability to cause the land to vegetate (because it does not have the ability to cause anything), does that mean that, through Ghazali’s view, God’s guidance and knowledge that he sends to us does not cause anyone to be guided? If the Prophet is utilizing rain as an example of God’s knowledge, but rain in it of itself has no way to cause the land to grow and vegetate (because there is no such thing as secondary causation) then, following through with the analogy, that means that God’s knowledge also does not have any ability to cause people to believe in God or be guided. The Quran, the Prophet, and even hadiths do not have in it of themselves the intrinsic property of causing people to believe. This seems like a faulty analogy because no one will say God’s guidance does not cause anyone to become a Muslim; but, if we follow the analogy through all the way, then comparing God’s guidance with the rain that cannot cause anything, then that means God’s knowledge cannot cause people to be guided. If that is the case, then this Hadith does not defend human free will. If God’s knowledge and guidance cannot cause people to believe because it has no intrinsic property, and similar to the rain and the land, God only makes it so the rain hits the land at the same time the land produces something, then God’s knowledge and one’s belief in God simply occurs at the same time and one’s belief in God is not caused by the knowledge of God itself. Therefore, our guidance by God’s knowledge can only be done by God allowing us to accept it and not by our own choice to accept it. Therefore, the Ghazallian view falls squarely inline with that of the view of the Jahmiyyah.
If this is the case, then the Prophet's analogy is faulty. Why would the Prophet liken Allah's knowledge to that of rain which has no property to produce anything? The Prophet obviously does not make any faulty analogies because he is the Prophet of God. So is the hadith weak? Well the hadith comes from the most reliable book of hadith out there, Sahih Bukhari. Any way one looks at it, the Ghazallian view leads to contradictions when looking at this hadith. If we simply took the Ibn Taymiyyan view of secondary causation, then no contradictions are found.
While Ghazalli and his followers uphold a middle path between free will and determinism, in looking at these verses and hadiths, we see that Ghazali’s theory has several issues. Not only are there verses that clearly show secondary causation, but many of these verses and hadiths are simply better explained with that of Ibn Taymiyyah’s theory over that of Ghazali’s theory. Therefore, in looking at all of these verses and hadiths, we see that Ibn Taymiyyah’s theory is more inline with the Quran and the sunnah than that of Imam Ghazali’s view.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have seen the importance of Qadr in the Islamic tradition. Qadr is one of the 6 pillars of Iman and thus it is foundational to one being a Muslim that he must accept Qadr (with all 4 principles). Another aspect that we have come across is that of free will. Islam is not an absolute deterministic religion, there are many verses and hadiths that indicate that in Islam we have free will. Combining these two groups of verses and hadiths together, we see that Islam upholds a compatibilist view, a view in which upholds Allah’s ultimate power and him determining and willing things to exist, and also that of allow human agency and human free will. However, what is up to debate is not whether Islam is a religion that holds absolute determinism or full free will, but rather, how best can we explain this process of compatibilism.
In looking at Ibn Taymiyyah’s theory and Imam Ghazali’s theory, we see that Ibn Taymiyyah’s understanding of God’s power and secondary causation is more inline with the Quran and Sunnah than that of Imam Ghazali’s. Whether one finds one more philosophically convincing than the other was not the point of this paper. The purpose was to show that by looking at the Quranic verses and the hadiths of the Prophet, we see that this notion of secondary causation is present in much of the Islamic corpus. While Imam Ghazali’s view of occasionalism and Kasb are present as well, and is a view that does combine both aspects of free will and determinism, ultimately, Ibn Taymiyyah’s view is slightly more convincing when looking at the Quran and Sunnah.
Work Cited
“The Noble Quran.” Quran.Com, quran.com/en. Accessed 12 Aug. 2024.
“Aspects of Belief in Divine Decree! (Al-Qadr).” Al, Al-Mohsinun, 14 Oct. 2023, www.almohsinun.com/post/aspects-of-belief-in-divine-decree-al-qadr.
An-Nawawi. 40 Hadith. Diwan Press, 1981.
Bukhari, Al. Sahih Al-Bukhari 79 - Knowledge - كتاب العلم - Sunnah.Com - Sayings and Teachings of Prophet Muhammad (صلى الله عليه و سلم), sunnah.com/bukhari:79#:~:text=The%20Prophet%20(%EF%B7%BA)%20said%2C,vegetation%20and%20grass%20in%20abundance. Accessed 12 Aug. 2024.
Ġazzālī, Abū-Ḥāmid Muḥammad Ibn-Muḥammad Al-, and Michael E. Marmura. The Incoherence of the Philosophers. Brigham Young University Press, 2000.
Hoover, Jon. Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism, 28 May 2007, https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004158474.i-270.
Moad, Omar Edward. “Al-Ghazali’s occasionalism and the natures of creatures.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 58, no. 2, Oct. 2005, pp. 95–101, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-005-1595-0.
Mutrofin, Amira Wadiana. “The Essence of Freedom in Qadariyah in Existentialism’s Perspective.” International Conference on Islam, Law, and Society, 2022, file:///C:/Users/Petrit%20Kola/Downloads/INCOILS_Freedom+in+Qadariyah_Amira+Wardiana_UINSatuTulungagung+-+Amira+Wardiana%20(1).pdf.
Salem, Feryal (2016). The Emergence of Early Sufi Piety and Sunnī Scholasticism. Brill.
Suarning. (2023). The Concept of Al-Kasb Theory in Islamic Theology: A Critical Analysis from Quranic Perspective. International Journal of Cultural and Religious Studies, 3(1), 32–36. https://doi.org/10.32996/ijcrs.2023.3.1.4
Taymiyyah, “Al-≠Aqīda al-Tadmuriyya.” MF,