Euthyphro's Dilemma and the Islamic solution
“Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?” (10a).
These were the famous words that Socrates said to Euthyphro. Is something pious because the gods determine it is pious; or, is it pious because the thing itself has piety within it? The Euthyphro dilemma is one of the first topics discussed in the realm of philosophy of religion. In many Philosophy 101 classes, and even advanced master level classes do students read and write about Euthyphro's dilemma. However, what exactly is the Euthyphro dilemma? Why is it problematic? And how does Islam provide the solution to this centuries long dilemma? In this article, we will tackle all of these issues.
What is the Euthyphro dilemma?
In Plato's book, Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro what piety means. One of the answers that Euthyphro gives to Socrates is that piety is what is loved by the gods. Socrates then says his famous line that was quoted at the start of this article: "Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?" It is through this very line that the Euthyphro's dilemma was created. However, nowadays, in modern discussion of the dilemma, the dilemma is worded slightly different.
The great polymath and philosopher, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, reformulated the Euthyphro dilemma in its modern iteration. He asks: "is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good and just" (Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice Circa 1702). Leibniz is essentially asking do conceptions of good or evil and right and wrong come from God alone? Or do these conceptions of good and justice come from God because those concepts are good in it of themselves? Is giving money to the poor good because God says so or is giving money to the poor good because it is in it of itself good?
Now what exactly is the problem that both Socrates, Leibniz, and maybe your philosophy professor are trying to get at? What is the dilemma here? The dilemma is this: if we were to claim that good is something that comes solely from God, then what God dictates that is good is completely arbitrary. God could dictate that 'good' is to steal from the poor or to cheat on your exams for instance. If the conceptions of good are solely from God, then anything goes basically. If, however, God dictates that something is good because the thing itself is good, then there seems to be a force outside of God that God follows in order to put down the rules for us. In that sense, God is under the law of these conceptions of good and evil and what he dictates must go based off of this outside force.
If one were to accept the first horn of the dilemma, that goodness comes from God, then God's commands are arbitrary. If one were to accept the second horn, that something is good because it itself is good, then God is seemingly losing some of His powers and there is something outside of God dictating how God should act and what He should command. This is the strength of the Euthyphro's dilemma. The theists is in a catch-22 scenario. No matter what side they choose, something important must be given up.
Now that we understood the dilemma, we will now look at how the Islamic conception of God solves this dilemma for us. In order to solve this dilemma, we need to find a solution that 1) shows that God does not command us to do things arbitrarily and 2) that there is no outside force that God follows. I believe that once we look at God's divine names and attributes in the Islamic tradition, we are able to come up with a solution that avoids both problems 1 and 2.
God’s divine names and attributes
In order to meet the dilemma through the Islamic understanding of God’s names and attributes, we need to first understand what is the Islamic concept of God’s names and attributes. Briefly put, in Islam God has 99 names that we know of and more attributes. God necessarily has these names and attributes. Put it simply, if someone were to argue for a conception of God that did not have these names and attributes, then that would not be the Islamic conception of God. There are several principles that need to be affirmed for all of God's names and attributes. In the Islamic theologian Ibn Uthaymeen's book, Qiwaird al Muthlah (Exemplary principle concerning the beautiful names of Allah), Ibn Uthaymeen gives us some of the fundamental principles regarding God's divine names and attributes. While there are many principles mentioned in his book, there are 3 that are of utmost importance in relation to Euthyhpro's dilemma.
The first rule that is given by many who uphold the Athari position is that God’s names and attributes are perfect. Ibn Uthaymeen writes,“Everything that truly exists must have an attribute, and that attribute must either be a perfect one or a deficient one. The latter is rejected when referring to the Perfect Lord who deserves our worship (Uthaymeen 2009, 55). Essentially, if God has an attribute than that attribute is perfect. Perfect here means that his names and attributes are all-encompassing and have no deficiency. For instance, God has the attribute of being the most merciful, i.e., he has the most perfect form of mercy, and he is not deficient in his mercy whatsoever. If we were to discuss an evil-God, then this evil-God would be the most perfect form of evil (i.e., have no deficiency in him being evil).
The second important rule is that all of God’s names and attributes are the most beautiful. Essentially, God’s names have no relation to evilness or to something bad; but rather, they exemplify the most beauty (Uthaymeen 2009,19). The Quran states “And to Allah belongs the most beautiful names (Quran 7:180).” In relation to this discussion on the problem of evil, God’s names do not have connection to evil or anything bad; but rather, they all mean something beautiful and good. If we were to flip that for an evil-God, then this God’s names and attributes are all evil.
The last rule is that all of these names and attributes can be found, and are only found within the Quran and Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). Essentially, none of the names or attributes of God were simply made up as time went on. This may seem like a small rule, however, it is important to understand that these names are not made up. For us muslims, God Himself has told us about His names and attributes either through the Quran or through His Prophet.
Now that we went over the principles of God’s divine names and attributes within the Islamic corpus, let us take a look at some of the names and attributes of God prior to dealing with this dilemma. God has 99 names (that we know of) and more attributes. Some of these names are Al-Rahman (the most-merciful), al-Ghafoor (the most-Forgiving), al-Jabbar (the compeller, the amender), Al-Bar (the most good). God necessarily has these names, i.e., if one were to argue for a God that does not have these names, then that thing is not God based on the Islamic context. God also has the attributes that arise from these names. So, God being Al-Rahman, the most-merciful, God also has the attributes of being merciful.
Dealing with the dilemma
Now that we went over both the principles of God’s names and attributes and looked at some examples, we can finally tackle the Euthyphro dilemma. Once again we have two horns of the dilemma to deal with. We need to find a solution that does not 1) make God’s commands arbitrary, and 2) does not allude to the conception of good to be outside of God. Now let us look at the first horn of the dilemma we have to tackle: are God's commands arbitrary? Through the understanding of God's divine names and attributes we see that that is not the case. Whatever God commands He commands them because He wants to manifest his names and attributes into the world. God wants his forgiveness, his mercy, he wisdom and so on to be manifested because a world where his names and attributes are manifested is a better world than a world in which his names and attributes are not manifested. God's command of prayer, Hajj, fasting, charity, and so on all relate back to his divine names and attributes.
In terms of the second horn of the dilemma, that of an outside force dictating what is good, by understanding God's names and attributes, we understand that God Himself is the good. His names such as Al-Barr, the source of goodness, Al-Rahman, the most merciful, Al-Ghafoor, the most forgiving, and Al-Razaq, the most generous, all allude to god being good Himself. What this means is that there is no outside source for understanding what is good because by God's very nature God IS the good. From our own first person perspective, these names of God we see as good in our day to day lives. Being merciful, forgiving people, giving money to the poor; all of these are good and these are also the names of God as well. If God is good, then what is good does not come outside of God because God necessarily has all of these good traits through his names and attributes.
Dealing with these two horns of this question, we see that the Euthyphro dilemma is not a dilemma for the Islamic God. We do not have a reality where what is good is arbitrarily from God, because whatever God commands is good comes from his own names and attributes. We also do not have a reality that what is good comes from some outside source other than God because God is the ultimate source of what we see as good because his names and attributes are what we see and understand as good. With this understanding of God's names and attributes through the Islamic paradigm, we are able to escape the Euthyphro's dilemma.